Lifelines are those essential services which support the life of our communities. These are either utility services such as water, wastewater, power, gas and telecommunications, or transportation networks and associated nodes.

The lifelines process

The twin overall objectives of lifelines engineering are firstly to reduce damage levels following a major disaster event, and secondly to reduce the time taken by these lifelines services to restore their usual level of service. This saving in time translates directly into a saving for the community as a result of reduced disruption to homes, offices and industries. The lifelines engineering process is aimed at minimising the vulnerability of lifelines and involves the following key steps:

• Identifying the hazards which could affect each lifeline network

• Assessing the vulnerability of each lifeline network

• Assessing the potential damage to each network

• Identifying and implementing practical mitigation measures.

• Compiling comprehensive response plans.

This process is effectively a risk management process - identifying areas and elements of high risk and developing strategies to manage this risk. It is, however, important to realise that lifelines work represents an ongoing process, involving the progressive implementation and monitoring of the strategies identified. It can be seen that there are strong links with everyday management of utility organisations, particularly with respect to asset management. The growing awareness of the importance of infrastructure has also contributed to the demand for this work to be undertaken.

Lifelines engineering began with the growing realisation that while considerable effort had been put into understanding the seismic response of buildings, relatively little was known about the likely performance of utility services. Similarly, in the case of transportation networks, while the individual structural response of major elements such as bridges had been extensively studied, the post-disaster performance of the networks as a whole had not been considered in anywhere near the same detail.

In New Zealand, lifelines work had its origins with the 1989 Centre for Advanced Engineering Wellington Case Study¹, which was unique internationally in both scope and approach. Christchurch was the next group to follow on after Wellington, becoming established early in 1993. The Christchurch Engineering Lifelines Group has recently published a 300+ page record of its work and findings, entitled Risks and Realities: a Multidisciplinary Approach to the Vulnerability of Lifelines to Natural Hazards². 1996 saw five new groups established - Auckland, Wairarapa, Timaru, Dunedin and Southland. Groups were also set up in Hawke's Bay and Waikato in 1997, and more are planned in a number of other locations.

Lifelines engineering has expanded in scope in recent years from its earthquake origins to address other natural hazards events such as flooding; rain, wind and snow storm; tsunami and volcanic effects.

The initiation of several major infrastructure upgrading projects is directly attributable to the `wake-up call' provided by this work in the early part of the decade. The CAE study identified the Thorndon area as being the most critical area in the Wellington region, due to the combination of its proximity to the Wellington fault, the extent of early harbour reclamation and the proliferation of lifelines that pass through this narrow strip of land. Immediately after the Wellington project was completed in 1991, Transit New Zealand commenced a study into the likely seismic performance of the Thorndon Overbridge, which is the main highway entrance to the city. This overbridge was designed progressively through the 1960s and early 1970s to design standards that are now recognised as not being as comprehensive as those of today. The study undertaken on behalf of Transit New Zealand identified structural and foundation shortcomings, and the resulting $18m retrofit programme is well advanced.

The key benefit of lifelines studies is the generation of a much clearer picture of what the real situation is likely to be after a major natural disaster. A great deal of emphasis is placed on the coordination between the many organisations involved after a disaster event. Lifelines are highly interdependent - that is to say, the ability of any individual utility service provider to recover after a major event is typically governed by the response of other utility organisations. As with all aspects of disaster management, it can be seen that utility response is essentially a team game, with the weakest link inevitably governing overall disaster response. This simple concept provides a strong incentive for utility service providers and transportation network operators to work together collectively - lifelines groups are simply the facilitator for this process. The fundamental principle of individual organisations being responsible for their own response however still applies.

Lifelines work involves a high level of research and investigation work, including the study of the effects of major overseas events. Study teams sent by the Wellington and Christchurch Groups following both the Northridge and Kobe earthquakes brought back valuable lessons for New Zealand lifelines operators³. The most significant of these included the importance of reestablishing transportation links as quickly as possible, and the need to have an integrated response plan at national, regional and local levels. Interaction with US and Japanese counterparts as part of these visits has confirmed that New Zealand is at the forefront internationally in this field of engineering. The willingness of our utility organisations to exchange mitigation and preparedness information, even in competitive situations, in the interests of enhancing disaster mitigation and preparedness is the envy of overseas agencies.

The need for coordination

The October 1997 initial meeting of representatives of each of the lifelines groups was set up largely to address the coordination of the activities and methodologies of the various groups. With the new groups following a similar path to those of their predecessors, it is imperative that the experiences and findings of the earlier efforts are passed on in a systematic manner. There was also agreement to pursue a unified approach to the specific and key area of vulnerability assessment, and to make sure that the risk management principles of NZS 4360 are followed as far as possible. There was strong support at the October 1997 forum for a greater level of interaction and coordination between the groups established to date and the new groups to follow. As yet there is not the willingness to form a national organisation on a formal structured basis. The meeting agreed to meet again before the end of 1998, providing suitable funding can be obtained. Issues relating to funding are a recurrent theme; much of the lifelines work to date has been carried out on a voluntary basis or as an `in kind' contribution by local member organisations. The long-term sustainability of this is being increasingly questioned given the widening level of activities and high expectations of the utility and transportation sector organisations.

Efforts at coordination are made more difficult by the fact that lifelines work does not actually have a `home'. This is largely due to its multi-disciplinary nature, which is not confined to engineering interests. While the first four steps of identifying the hazards, assessing the vulnerability, assessing the potential damage and identifying and implementing mitigation measures have a strong scientific and engineering basis, the successful implementation of the measures and strategies identified often requires significant input from emergency management agencies. Their ability to reach out and involve the community complements the earlier engineering inputs.

The establishment of a new emergency management regime will have a major influence on the future direction of lifelines work in New Zealand. The Emergency Management Group proposal is one of the key elements of the proposed new structure. Current proposals are that each EMG should feature a lifelines representative from the community of interest to assist with the general mitigation and preparedness work. Having lifelines activities effectively mandated in this way would require the systematic establishment of groups throughout the country, thereby setting a strong platform for the unified progression of this work in terms of both coordination and funding.

In other current developments, communications systems are being reviewed to identify the most appropriate system for emergency communications between individual organisations and lifelines coordination centres. A major earthquake is likely to cause congestion in the telephone network, and backup systems are clearly needed. The rate of change of telecommunications technology is very rapid, and options for communicating in a disaster are growing in number, quality and robustness. Satellite systems utilising portable terminals operating through low orbit satellites appear to be the most robust option, but their high capital cost is currently prohibitive. A low capital investment approach is being recommended until national emergency coordination mechanisms are clarified and the cost of the new technology reduces. Another current project involves the development of a framework for identifying the economic benefit from lifelines-related work. As well as enabling individual mitigation or preparedness projects to be justified, there is a desire at a regional level to demonstrate the overall community benefits of these investments.

The key to success of lifelines work in New Zealand lies in its ability to portray the wider view of risk due to natural hazards. This reflects the two key aspects of the overall process - firstly, to utility organisations as being part of their core asset management and risk management responsibilities, and secondly, to the community as a key part of community emergency preparedness.

References

1. Centre for Advanced Engineering 1991. Lifelines in Engineering - Wellington Case Study, Project Summary and Project Report, Centre for Advanced Engineering, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand.

2. Christchurch Engineering Lifelines Group, 1998. Risks and Realities: a Multidisciplinary Approach to the Vulnerability of Lifelines to Natural Hazards, Centre for Advanced Engineering, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand.

3. Wellington Earthquake Lifelines Group Report Series 1993, 1994 and 1995, Wellington Regional Council, Wellington, New Zealand.